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Abstract 
Some industries exhibit external economies of scale. In these cases, government 
intervention may generate increases of welfare through tax-subsidy programmes 
and advanced purchasing commitments. The issue is initially examined for the 
case of competitive markets in a long-run equilibrium.  Then, taking the vaccines 
industry as an illustrative example, the paper proposes a suitable framework that is 
tailored to account for the most relevant characteristics of the real situation. The 
paper concludes advocating for intervention in competitive markets whenever 
economies of scale exist and implementing the policy is inexpensive. 
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Introduction 
This paper illustrates that social welfare can be improved by introducing tax-
subsidy programs in markets with external economies of scale. In addition to this, 
the paper examines the vaccine industry as an illustrative example in which the 
issue can be tested in practice.  The aim of the paper is thus twofold: First, to 
develop a theoretical model for proving that, under certain circumstances, 
intervention of competitive markets through redistributive income policies always 
lead to Pareto-improving situations; second, to present an ad hoc theoretical 
framework with which to analyse the modern industry of vaccines. This will permit 
to apply some of the theoretical ideas of the paper to understand how the modern 
vaccines industry operates at the present. 
Before we start the analysis, it is useful to record some basic theoretical principles. 
Generally, to achieve the highest possible level of welfare, economic theory 
recommends avoiding intervention in competitive markets.  However, in the 
presence of externalities, correcting this type of market failure is prescribed for the 
market to deliver the best outcome in terms of welfare.1 We are going to focus here 
on the external economies of scale affecting the supply-side of the market, which 
implies that the aggregate supply presents a negative slope in the long-run.2   In 
particular, our attempt is to show how public policies may affect the market in a 
way that the price diminishes as the size of the industry grows, thereby permitting 
that all the economic agents expand their welfare level. 
External economies of scale occur when a fall in unit costs arises from an 
expansion of an industry, without necessarily increasing the size of individual firms.  
Of course, this is possible because any number of firms may enter the market in 
the long run. From a theoretical point of view, economists largely acknowledge the 
compatibility of external economies of scale with competitive markets: Chipman 
(1970) provides interesting comments for the theoretical debate, while Meade 
(1952, p. 33) makes it clear that perfect competition can prevail under conditions of 
increasing returns insofar as the economies are external to individual firms. 
This paper stresses the role played by external economies of scale in industries 
that, though being small in number, are nonetheless significant. Among the 
examples mentioned in the literature, some affect prominent markets.3 The 
contribution of our analysis is the demonstration that, when discriminating among 
buyers is something possible, it is always realisable to design self-financing tax-
subsidy schemes that expand the social welfare. In particular, the paper shows that 
government intervention in competitive markets may be welfare improving if 
external economies of scale are present. 
As regards the related literature, some authors, like Thépot (2003), have tackled 
the issue within the context of imperfect competition. Our approach deviates from 
                                                                                                         
1 Externalities are identified as one of the causes of market failures, whose distortions should be 
corrected through regulation.  Previous studies have granted support to the view that government 
intervention is justified in front of externalities; See for instance: Chandra, Franck and Naqvi (2002), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Panagariya (1981). 
2 Another possible approach adopts a demand-side perspective: The so-called network economies of 
scale result in individuals enjoying better market conditions as new consumers enter the industry. 
Although this is an interesting phenomenon, its analysis is left aside for the moment. Notice that, even if 
the type of economies considered here are basically linked to the supply, our approach involves both 
sides of the market, since tax-subsidy schemes do actually alter the elasticity of demand. 
3 Trade theorists, dating back to Graham (1923), had recognized the beneficial effects of real-locating 
resources to increasing returns to scale industries.  See also Ethier (1982) in this regard. For a 
description of external economies in markets for cultural products, such as books, motion pictures, 
newspapers, etc., see Marvasti (1994). This paper explains how economies of scale derived from the 
population size lead to comparative advantage in trade. Besides, the presence of external economies of 
scale in the cotton industry is documented by Broadberry and Marrison (2002). 
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these studies in the fact that we examine perfectly competitive situations. Thépot 
(2003) showed that government intervention (through income transfers, for 
instance) is able to correct the market failures associated with imperfect 
competition and to restore the Pareto efficiency. Yet, Pareto-improving policies are 
easily explained when some degree of market power exists. This is due to the fact 
that regulations can generate greater efficiency by bringing the market equilibrium 
closer to the competitive one. In contrast with that,  our results do not derive from 
correcting market failures associated with market power, but stem from the greater 
efficiency associated to the external economies of scale existing in certain 
industries. 
Two seminal papers ought to be mentioned in this context. Aoki (1971) shows first 
that a tax-subsidy system makes the competitive market mechanism work 
efficiently in various economic environments with externalities. Then, Osana (1977) 
goes beyond and proves that, in a wide class of economies with Marshallian 
externalities, a Pareto optimum can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium with 
the aid of a tax-subsidy system. The conclusions reached by these two papers are 
beyond the scope of our study. Nonetheless, the model presented here deals with 
the topic in an original way and, more interestingly, permits concluding that self-
financing tax subsidy policies can always be implemented so that they lead to 
Pareto-improving situations. 
The relevance of the theoretical points described so far depends on the possibility 
of them to occur in real industries. Note first that our theoretical idea may grant 
support to the rationality of existing policies, such as granting home ownership 
vouchers in India or low-cost access to mobile phone technology in African 
countries. In particular, the applied section of the paper focuses on the case of the 
vaccines market, a peculiar part within the pharmaceutical industry. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Having motivated the topic in the 
introduction, Section 2 proposes a basic theoretical model for approaching the 
issue in a competitive framework in the long-run.  Then, Section 3 accommodates 
the analysis to the vaccines industry.  This new framework, tailored to account for 
the chosen example, is apposite to illustrate how our theoretical idea applies to 
existing industries. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions of the 
paper. 
The model 
The analysis of this section is carried out in a partial equilibrium context at the long- 
run. We examine the case of a linear demand, even if other functional 
specifications may of course be also valid. 
Consider a competitive industry with external economies of scale and identical 
firms.  The total cost function of each firm is CT(x) = c(X )x, where x represents the 
production of the individual firm and X  accounts for the total quantity traded in the 
industry. The market demand is given by P = d − dX, in which the quantity 
demanded at zero price has been normalized to one. Notice that neither linearity or 
normalization of the demand function implies loss of generality. 
Following Thépot (2003), the analysis could be applied to a one-unit goods market. 
(This approach is particularly conclusive for highly-esteemed or indispensable 
goods; such as vaccinations, housing, or access to communications or education). 
We assume that a continuum of consumers with identical preferences exists whose 
disposable income for this good differs among them but is uniformly distributed. 
Thus, the consumers’ reservation prices for one unit  of good directly stems from 
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their income, leading to a linear demand in which d represents the income of the 
richest consumer.4 
In this context, the implementation of redistributive policies by the government can 
lead to an equilibrium with a greater quantity and a diminishing price. More- over, 
tax-subsidy schemes can be always devised in such a way that they preserve the 
welfare level of each individual under taxation, while improving the welfare of 
subsidized consumers. Notice that competitive industries bring forth no 
extraordinary profits to producers in the long-run, since individual firms have no 
market power. Accordingly, the total social welfare is composed of the surplus of 
consumers and the government solely. Figure 1 illustrates this situation, where the 
initial equilibrium is found at (P, X1). 
Figure 1.Welfare improvements of self-financing tax subsidy programmes 
 
The logic of the argument can readily be seen with the aid of the graphical 
representation. The government could be able to reduce the average production 
cost if it can provoke an expansion of the industry output, thereby lowering the 
costs of individual firms operating in a larger industry. Because of average cost 
pricing, the expansion of the industry leads to a lower consumer price at 
equilibrium. 
But, how does the government expand the demand for the good while meeting a 
self-financing requirement? First, the government taxes high-reservation-price 
buyers, keeping the tax-inclusive price for these consumers at the initial price. 
Because the price faced by these consumers does not change, they do not gain or 
lose consumer surplus. The revenue generated through the taxes imposed on the 
first group of consumers is then transferred to low-consumer-surplus buyers in the 
form of a consumption subsidy, inducing new buyers to enter the market for the 
first time. Overall, subsidized buyers gain consumer surplus because of the lower 
market price, the subsidy, and the additional surplus accruing to new buyers. The 
                                                                                                         
4 The point is clear in the case of consumers who buy, at most, one single unit of the commodity. But 
the analysis is still valid as long as the tax charges consumption and the subsidy takes the form of a 
voucher. Besides, it is important to be aware now that Section 3 will adopt a different interpretation of 
the demand by representing the social willingness to pay involving both the private and public sector. 
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tax-subsidy scheme is more than a transfer from one group of buyers to another; it 
improves welfare because the average cost of the product has been lowered.5 
A more formal description of the issue follows. If the final aggregate production is 
set at the level X, the total amount of the subsidy is defined by s = c(X) − (d − dX), 
and the tax by t = P − c(X). 
The first step is then calculating the number of individuals, α, who must be taxed to 
ensure that the programme is self-financing. (In terms of the areas of Figure 1, the 
self-financing constraint implies T = C + D + F).  Then, we solve (P − c(X)) α = (X − 
α)s, and obtain: 
  X
dX)(dP
dX)(dc(X)αorX
ts
sα 
      (1) 
The meaning of the previous result is straightforward. For the programme to be 
always affordable, the required number of individuals paying the tax is a fraction of 
the total number of final consumers, which is determined by the relative weight of 
the subsidy as shown in (1). 
Besides, note that the drop in prices implies that none of the α contributing 
consumers experience welfare losses once the programme has been 
implemented. Moreover, as  far as X  > X1,  any feasible self-financing  transfer 
entails positive increases in social welfare,  represented  as A+B+C+D or 
T+A+B−F in Figure 1, and defined by the equation: 
W (X) = (s + t)(X1 − α) + 2 (s + t)(X − X1)      (2) 
Expression (1) has established the condition under which the transfer programme 
is costless for society and, hence, immediately affordable. Then, the second step is 
exploring how the size of the market X can be determined, which of course will 
depend on the target pursued by the policy makers. 
Maximizing the social welfare 
Initially, we consider the case in which the government aims to establish the level 
of X that maximizes total welfare. In our model, the value that society assigns to 
consuming amount X is calculated as V(X) = d (X − 0.5 X2).  Defining the cost of 
producing X as CT(X) = c(X)X, and given that the government seeks maximizing 
V (X) − CT(X), we get the first order condition for a maximum: 
*)X('cd
*)X(cd*Xor
*X
s*)X('c 
       (3) 
The optimal level X* is such that it entails the greater increase in social welfare. 
This optimal value is only congruent for X* < 1, and defines a maximum if the 
second order condition is verified, which in our model requires: 
d + 2c’ (X*) + c’’(X*)X* > 0       (4)  
                                                                                                         
5 In other words, to illustrate our point while avoiding unnecessary complications, the setting of the 
model adds a couple of assumptions: On the one hand, it assumes that the tax charges consumption 
and that the subsidy is granted in the form of a voucher. In this way, we prevent the effects of 
redistributive policies to affect other demands of the markets. On the other hand, we account for 
government intervention as the mechanism through which to exclude, from claiming and receiving 
subsidies, the individuals who can initially afford the good.  There are other situations in which similar 
features may apply.   For instance, it is surely the case if these two circumstances occur together: (i) 
uncertainty about the actual amount of the good that people will eventually consume; and (ii) the 
necessity to take a decision on the amount needed upfront, before and regardless of the willingness to 
pay that private consumers have in reality.  The analysis of that type of situation is made in Section 3, 
where we examine the overall social demand for vaccines. 
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Note, however, that the fulfilment of the above inequality is not necessarily 
warranted. Among other things, the value of α associated to X* might be greater 
that X1, implying that the solution is not feasible. But even then, the important fact 
remains that the government is always in the position to ensure welfare gains. This 
may be done by simply establishing the level of X associated with the maximum 
level of coverage in the industry; that is to say, by setting α = X1. 
Maximizing the size of the industry 
Consider now that the goal of the government (rather than maximizing welfare) is 
providing access to the industry to as many individuals as possible. In accordance 
with this aim, the X1 initial consumers must be contributing consumers, which 
permits collecting the largest amount of funds to afford the greatest possible 
subsidy scheme. The problem is solved by equalizing α to X1, which determines 
the level of maximum coverage: 
1Xs
tsX           (5) 
The last expression is only consistent for values of 

X that are always greater than 
X1, since (s+t) > s. But again, it might also be the case that the full coverage of the 
market is reached for a number of contributing consumers smaller than α = X1.  In 
other words, the size of the market imposes the feasibility constraint: 

X  ≤ 1. 
Hence, if the value delivered in (5) does not satisfy the feasibility constraint, the 
optimal outcome instead has to be the corner solution defined by 

X  = 1 and α = 
s/(s+t). Note anyway that the government always achieves its purpose of 
maximizing the coverage level.   Whether the maximum feasible self-financing 
coverage is the one established in (5) or it is 

X  = 1 is an incidental matter. 
The vaccine industry:  an illustrative example 
Some troubles may arise regarding the feasibility of implementing the tax-subsidy 
scheme and, more importantly, concerning the actual relevance of our theoretical 
argument in real markets. To come across these difficulties, this section adapts the 
theoretical elements to fit with the organisational aspects of the vaccines industry, 
which provides us with a suitable example. 
The activities and features that characterise the vaccine industry are described, for 
instance, in Gordon and Samant (2008, p.  37): “The vaccine industry is composed 
of companies that are engaged in any of the following activities: research, 
development, manufacture, or sales, marketing and distribution of vaccines (...). 
Vaccine development is difficult, complex, highly risky, and costly and includes 
clinical development, process development and assay development.”  In 
accordance with that, to judge the existence of external economies one should 
examine the above mentioned activities one by one. 
On one hand, these authors stress that, at the manufacturing stage, some 
production processes in the vaccine industry are scalable. This implies that a 
greater size of the manufacturing laboratory (or a larger market) would permit the 
unit cost per vaccine to be reduced.  Nonetheless, it seems that other 
manufacturing activities are not scalable, thereby implying that the unit 
manufacturing cost of vaccines does not significantly decrease as the production 
volume expands. 
On the other hand, unlike in the manufacturing processes, the existence of external 
economies of scale has to be recognised at the research and development stage. 
Precisely, Gordon and Samant (2008: 41) point out that the size of the market is a 
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crucial factor in developing new vaccines: ‘A typical vaccine company will have 
several vaccine candidates in basic research... Those that are most promising in 
terms of technical feasibility, strong patent protection, and potential market size will 
be taken forward into development ...  Thus, go/no go decisions must be made and 
market size is a major determinant of the choice between two candidate vaccines 
...  This system has worked extremely well for vaccines with large potential markets 
in the developed world when technical feasibility is demonstrated. It does not work 
for vaccines for diseases which exist predominantly in the poorer regions of the 
world ...; it works imperfectly for diseases of the developed world that affect only a 
relatively few persons because of geographic restriction.’ 
In any case, the existence of economies of scale in this type of industries should 
not be a surprise, insofar as the success in this business depends on research 
activities.  Indeed, once the companies have assumed heavy investments and 
capital risks associated to research, a larger potential market makes more likely 
that the monetary return compensates for the initial expenses.6 
In conclusion, we should accept that the cost of developing (and to some extent 
the cost of producing and commercialising) this type of medicines decreases along 
with the size of the market: the more units produced, the cheaper the average 
costs. Hence, the vaccines industry seems an appropriate context in which to apply 
the idea of this paper.7 
In particular, we examine here the provision of vaccines – in 2009 and 2010 – for 
preventing influenza H1N1 to spread out. The large potential size of the market (1 
billion doses of vaccinations were initially agreed, only in 2009, between the 
governments of the major economies and the industry) allowed for reducing the 
average production cost of the vaccine to about 2 € per unit.   Besides, as Table 1 
shows, a significant number of vaccines were donated to the less developed 
countries. Of course, should the aggregate demand of the market have a smaller 
size, the cost per unit of the vaccines would have been much larger.  This is 
typically the case in markets where a large amount of investments (for the research 
and development of new patents) are needed and must be repaid by the 
consumers who eventually buy the product. 
                                                                                                         
6 Gordon, Jerald and Vijay  (2008, p. 42) explicitly  explain that:  ’Large companies believe that vaccines 
should be priced according to value to society; reduction in health care and related costs, relief from 
pain and suffering, and/or  prevention of death, and that  they should be rewarded for taking the 
enormous risks inherent in early vaccine development. Such prices far exceed manufacturing costs, but 
are essential to produce the revenue streams that allow vaccines to be competitive for Research and 
Development and manufacturing resources within large pharmaceutical companies, or that make 
biotech companies attractive investment opportunities.’ A similar argument is given by Plotkin, 
Orenstein and Offit (2008, p.  xxi)  in the preface of their book: “This  high cost [to bring vaccines form 
initial  ideas to licensed biologicals] is a major disincentive for companies to develop new and improved 
vaccines. The requirement by major pharmaceutical companies for large markets to justify the expense 
of development means that many needed vaccines for geographically localized infections are not 
available.” 
7 Further information on the matter can be found again in Gordon, Jerald and Vijay (2008 : 40-1): ‘The 
role of large, full-service vaccine companies is predominantly in development. They engage in some 
limited basic research, significant amounts of targeted research regarding specific organisms, but the 
preponderance of activity is in clinical and process development. Expertise and sufficient personnel in 
process development and chemical engineering reside almost exclusively in such companies; there is 
no other resource for such development. Clinical development that will satisfy FDA standards is also 
done mostly by the large companies, funnelled through academia and contract research organizations...   
Many smaller organizations, often referred to as biotechnology companies, are engaged in vaccine 
research. They are often started by university scientists, supported by venture capitalists, and are 
capable of basic research on a vaccine idea. At this early state, they usually have limited capacity in 
process development and manufacturing, and none in distribution, sales, or marketing...  Because of the 
large cost of adding new capacities and expertise, many biotech companies in advanced product 
development will opt to partner with large, full-scale companies. Although 60 or so small companies 
claim engagement in vaccine research and development, only about a dozen or so consider it a major 
activity.’ 
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Table 1: Influenza H1N1: Vaccine Sales by Company and Donations 
Company 2009 Sales (Mill Euro)  Donors 
Donations* 
(Mill doses) 
Sanofi Aventis 580  Sanofi Aventis 100 
Glaxo Smith Kline 580  Glaxo Smith Kline 50 
Novartis 580  8 Rich countries 50 
Baxter 290    
MedImmune 290    
Sino Vac 116    
CSL 116    
Solvay 58    
Other Companies 690    
Total 3300  Total 200 
*The donations were made to WHO (World Health Organization). Sources: International meeting on the 
Inuenza H1N1 Vaccine Market.\Asociación Mémoire des Luttes (www.medelu.org) and KNOL unit of 
knowledge (http://knol.google.com/k/inuenza-2009-h1n1-vaccine-market). 
In summary, the vaccine industry is considered an illustrative example with which 
to analyze the theoretical ideas of this paper. Yet, given that the pharmaceutical 
companies must plan in advance the amount of vaccines they will produce, 
implementing self-financing programmes requires in practice that the governments 
approve the quantity before the private willingness to pay is revealed. This 
peculiarity, as well as the lack of information on some crucial aspects of the 
industry, has resulted in choosing the ad hoc framework of Section 3, which has 
been designed to account for the specific features of the case. 
A theoretical framework for the vaccines industry 
There is one critical issue that must be considered before applying our theoretical 
framework to the vaccines industry: to what extent does the vaccines industry 
behave as a competitive market?  According to Gordon and Samant (2008), about 
one-half of vaccines for children in the US are exchanged in the private market. It 
means that there is a significant share of the market where the price-setting takes 
place under a free market regimen. The rest is then delivered through 
organizations of public character at a reduced price.  And the share of free market 
tends to be smaller in Japan or in West European countries. 
Moreover, the mentioned authors explicitly state that:  ‘In addition to the bur- den of 
partial price controls, the vaccine industry is subject to intense regulation. It cannot 
sell products until the vaccine and the facility in which it is manufactured are 
approved by the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] or other regulatory 
authorities; each batch must be released by the appropriate regulatory agency; and 
the usage, and therefore market size, is largely determined in the United States by 
the CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] and in Europe by national 
regulatory authorities. Thus, the vaccine industry does not operate in a free-market 
environment, and its behaviour reflects these constraints.’ (cf Gordon and Samant, 
2008: 42). But, even if the last quote seems to be indisputably asserted, the debate 
must remain still open if considering the sub-industry of research and development 
activities.  Indeed, on the bases that  little  control is exerted on the initial  research, 
and given the large number of small laboratories and other institutions involved in 
the matter, denying absolutely the competitive behaviour (at least in activities of 
this market) seems misleading. 
Anyway, in front of these theoretical concerns, and due to lack of the necessary 
information, the applied section of this paper deviates from the preceding section. 
First, to deal with the theoretical analysis – while reflecting the manner in which the 
market operates in reality – in Section 3 we have taken into account the 
commitment of the governments to purchase certain amounts of vaccines. 
Typically, this agreement has to be made upfront, which is especially critical in 
order for the poor countries to enjoy cheaper prices. 
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The following text by Gordon and Samant (2008: 40-1) is very conclusive in this 
regard: ‘To involve large companies in development and manufacturing of vaccines 
to meet needs such as bio-defense  or health needs of poorer countries, incentives 
must be established to convince these companies that they should develop and 
manufacture  such products. Such incentives might take the form of guaranteed 
purchase of certain volumes of a vaccine if specified standards are met, direct 
contracting by a government agency, or some other publicly funded mechanism. 
The use of Advanced Market Commitments to create a funding mechanism for 
vaccines needed in the developing world has been endorsed...  Companies may 
be willing to engage in such work. Indeed, they may already have donated or sold 
vaccines at very low prices to poorer countries. Without special incentives, it is 
unrealistic to expect companies to engage in Research and Development on 
diseases that only, or predominantly, affect the poorer regions of the world.’   In 
other words, advanced government commitments are essential to make it possible 
that new consumer gain access to the market, thereby increasing the total size of 
the industry. 
Second, the issue cannot be treated with a single aggregate demand, as the 
subject seemed to require initially.  But this difficulty is not such that it hinders other 
ways to address the topic in an appropriate manner.  In particular, the domestic 
demand – that captures the overall willingness to pay of society – is going to be 
separately defined in each country by its respective government. Actually, 
governments are asked to commit themselves to buy vaccines at a price that is 
previously settled by the World Health Organization (WHO). The range of prices 
had previously been established according to the standard of living of the different 
countries.8 
Another relevant aspect of the vaccines are the positive externalities attached to 
health goods and services.  To account for this feature, the relevant demand in this 
case has to be defined as the overall willingness to pay of society, including the 
private consumers as well as the public sector. 
In summary, and with the aim of exemplifying some theoretical ideas of this paper, 
the model is tailored to account for the following characteristics: (i) uncertainty on 
the private consumers’ willingness to pay; (ii) public interest of the good under 
examination; (iii)  commitment of the government to buy a certain amount of goods, 
which has to be pre-established upfront; and (iv) self-financing programmes in 
which the full-coverage (up to the quantity chosen by the government) is warranted 
by design. 
A suitable model for the vaccines domestic market 
Let us describe now the way in which our theoretical analysis can be modified to 
explain how the vaccine industry operates in reality. The new theoretical elements 
are proposed so that the framework became suitable for dealing with the available 
information displayed in Table 2.  
                                                                                                         
8 According to the estimations of WHO, the price of the H1N1 vaccine would range between 2.5 and 20 
US✩, depending on the economic status of the buyer country.  The 2009 vaccine could be sold at 
around 10 to 20 US$ in western economies, in the range of 5 to 10 in mid-level developing countries 
and in the range of 2.5 to 5 in the poor economies. The latter countries were extendedly funded by 
charities, global agencies, the World Bank, etc. Many policy makers agree that charging patients and 
countries by their ability to pay is better than providing free treatments. 
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Table 2: Pandemic Influenza H1N1: Vaccine Orders and Purchases (2009-2010) 
Country 
Price 
per 
unit 
(€) 
Ordered 
Doses 
(Mill. 
units) 
Ordered 
Market 
Value 
(Mill. €) 
Purchased 
Doses 
(Mill.) 
Purchased 
Market 
Value 
(Mill. €) 
Used 
Doses 
(Mill.) 
Used 
Market 
Value 
(Mill. €) 
Spain 6.93 37 280.0 13 90.0 3 20.8 
France 9.25   94 869.0 5 46.3 
Germany 10.44   50 522.0 6 62.6 
Netherlands 9.21   34 313.2 15 138.2 
Italy 9.24   48 443.7   
Belgium 8.75   13 110.2   
UK 8.70 132 1148.4 48 417.6   
USA 8.67 251 2175.0 110 953.2   
Portugal 9.11 28 143.2     
Greece 9.18 24 220.4     
Australia 9.39 21 197.2     
Japan 9.19 53 487.2     
Canada 9.28 50 464.0     
Hungary 9.28 20 185.6     
Sweden 9.34 18 168.2     
Switzerland 9.37 13 121.8     
South Korea 9.37 13 121.8     
China 5.80 65 377.0     
Sources: International meeting on the Inuenza H1N1 Vaccine Market.\Asociación Mémoire des Luttes" 
(www.medelu.org) and KNOL unit of knowledge (http://knol.google.com/k/inuenza-2009-h1n1-vaccine-
market). 
In this regard, two important elements are going to be treated differently, as 
compared to Section 2: 
1. The long-run supply of the industry is now replaced with a function capturing the 
cost that society abides, due to the government commitment to purchase a fixed 
amount of vaccines. This function is then defined, for each country, as: 
PX = d,        for    )/,0( pdX         (6) 
where p  is the final price (per unit of vaccine) actually paid. 
2. Regarding the domestic demand, we focus here on the public sector, because it 
is the government who makes the purchasing decision.  The relevant demand in 
each country is therefore defined as the government willingness to pay for the 
vaccines. Besides, we assume that the government plays a subsidiary role, 
thereby accounting for the fact that some individuals are willing and able to afford 
themselves the cost of the vaccination. 
In accordance with that, we consider the government net willingness to pay as the 
result of taking into account the following two elements: 
(a) The social willingness to pay for the vaccines provision, as revealed by the sum 
paid upfront by the government (to account for the number of citizens that the 
government considers should be surely protected). Notice that the population is 
free to buy or not the vaccine at the price per unit shown, for 18 countries, in Table 
2. But, these people who initially decide not to buy the vaccine will eventually get 
free access to it, up to the level established by the ex ante decision of the 
government. The issue can thus be considered a subsidized consumption 
programme that ensures that a certain proportion of population joins the 
vaccination campaign. 
(b) The private willingness to pay for vaccinations, which implies alleviating the net 
amount of money spent by the government in this matter.  Of course, a large 
private consumption manifests a big private willingness to pay.  And hence, given 
the subsidiary role granted to the government, the resulting public willingness to 
pay becomes smaller. 
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The conjunction of these two elements, by subtracting the latter one (b) from the 
former (a), yields the effective public demand function, which we treat as the 
relevant domestic demand in each country (derived from the decision problem of 
the government): 
,XpdP  or
p
PdX         (7) 
The interpretation of this demand is straightforward. The government is ready to 
pay upfront a sum so high as to ensure sufficient vaccines freely available (for the 
proportion of the country’s population that was previously chosen). However, given 
its subsidiary role, the government’s willingness to pay decreases along with that of 
private consumers. But of course, the fact is that the private willingness to pay is 
known only after the payment for the vaccines has been made. 
Obviously, the above ad hoc description deviates from the framework developed in 
Section 2, implying that the graphical representation is also different.9 
To understand the particularities of this new approach, Figure 2 illustrates the 
situation. 
Figure 2: A suitable framework for the vaccines domestic market 
 
Among other features, the new framework implies that the full-coverage level is 
internally warranted by the model, regardless of the willingness to pay of private 
consumers. It is always the case, provided that the intervention of the government 
makes that any value given to the “old” α (as characterised in Section 2) is 
compatible with a self-financing programme. 
                                                                                                         
9 In fact, it may be argued that – within this framework – little difference exists between the costs and 
the willingness to pay. It is actually true that the specificities of this peculiar approach introduce some 
difficulties to rightly interpret the resulting demand and supply functions. 
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To avoid misunderstandings with the notation, in Section 3 we use β to express the 
amount of vaccines that private consumers are willing to buy.  Note further that, in 
Figure 2, the areas no longer represent the social welfare associated to consumer 
surplus (as it was the case in Section 2), since the functions here have a different 
meaning. Similarly, Table 3 shows the values of the relevant parameters and 
functions representing the situations of the countries for which sufficient 
information was available. 
Table 3: A Model for Influenza H1N1 Vaccine Market by Countries 
Country d X  p  Cost Function Demand Function 
France 869.0 94 9.2447 p X = 869 p = 869 –
94
869 · X 
Germany 522.0 50 10.440 p X = 522 p = 522 – 50
522
 · X 
Netherlands 313.2 34 9.2118 p X = 313.2 p = 313.2 – 34
2.313
 · X 
Spain 90.0 13 6.9231 p X = 90 p = 90 – 13
90
 · X 
Perhaps the most relevant feature of the new characterisation – of the model in 
Section 3 – is the fact that full-coverage is always achieved. For this to be under- 
stood, consider that the size of the vaccines market – as far as the public interest is 
concerned – is given by the fixed amount determined ex ante by the government. 
In this context, the actual amount of vaccines that private consumers purchase is 
denoted by β. But, of course, the amount purchased by private consumers, even if 
consistent with a full-coverage situation (as is the case for any other value of β in 
this framework), is not necessarily the optimal choice. 
In addition to full-coverage, it is easy to see that the model – in its current version 
– always delivers self-financing outcomes, insofar as public resources give support 
to the programme for it to be always affordable. A simple look at Table 4 permits 
easy verification of this feature, by cross checking the values of the relevant areas 
in Figure 2. Of course, the first identity that holds is: d = E + T + A’ = E + C + D + F. 
Table 4: Self-fnancing Programmes. Value of the Areas in Figure 2 by Countries 
Country T + A D + F T + A’ C + D + F E + T + A’ E + C +  D + F 
France 9.3452 9.3452 822.7766 822.7766 869.0 869.0 
Germany 10.6576 10.6576 459.3600 459.3600 522.0 522.0 
Netherlands 9.4999 9.4999 175.0235 175.0235 313.2 313.2 
Spain 7.5577 7.5577 69.2308 69.2308 90.0 90.0 
Then, in Table 5, we summarize the main results from sorting out some relevant 
values of the model.  The table reports the pair of values associated with various 
relevant values of the consumption levels of vaccines. For instance, if we consider 
the situation actually chosen by private consumers, β = X0, it comes out that the 
effective cost per unit of the vaccines eventually used is as high as P0.  Given the 
small demand for vaccinations that Table 4 reports (as deduced from the amount 
chosen by final private consumers in each country), P0 takes extremely high 
values. Of course, if we consider the so called full-coverage situation X , the price 
per unit is equal to the price per unit actually paid, p . 
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Table 5: Quantities and Prices. Influenza H1N1 Vaccine Market 
Country Β = X0 p = P0 X = X̄/2 P = 2 p  X = X1 p = P1 X = X  P = p  
France 5 173.8 47.0 18.49 92.9891 9.3452 94 9.2447 
Germany 6 87.0 25.0 20.88 48.9792 10.6576 50 10.4400 
Netherlands 15 20.9 17.0 18.42 32.9687 9.4999 34 9.2118 
Spain 3 30.0 6.5 13.85 11.9083 7.5577 13 6.9231 
Notice that, according to our assumptions, the payments eventually made by final 
consumers alleviate the government expenses in vaccines. If considering the case 
of β = X0, which corresponds to the number of vaccinations actually consumed, we 
get that the consumers pay the amount p , and the government subsidizes the 
rest: )pP( 0  . Naturally, the total amount of aggregating the public and public 
payment is equal to βP0. 
But the government must set upfront the number of vaccines, and it chooses X . 
At this larger amount, the effective price per unit becomes cheaper (the price drops 
from P0 to p ), which allows new consumers to gain access into the vaccine market. 
Again, the total expenses are afforded thanks to both the willingness to pay of 
private consumers: p ; and of the government: p)X(  . Hence, the overall 
payment in this case is given by pX , which, by design of the model, is equal to 
βP0. 
Finally, some comments may help to understand the logic of the model in its ad 
hoc version. To this aim Table 6 reports the calculations of estimating the effective 
cost per unit that the government affords at different possible values of β. The 
results of this exercise are computed with respect to both the number of vaccines 
eventually purchased by the consumers and with respect to the total available units 
agreed upfront by the government. 
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Table 6: Effective Government Cost per Unit (dependent on the chosen  ) 
 wrt Purchased Units by Consumers wrt Total Available Units 
β France (€/unit) 
Germany 
(€/unit) 
Netherland
s  
(€/unit) 
Spain 
(€/unit
) 
France 
(€/unit) 
Germany 
(€/unit) 
Netherland
s  
(€/unit) 
Spain 
(€/unit
) 
0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 9.24 10.44 9.21 6.92 
1 859.76 511.56 303.99 83.08 9.15 10.23 8.94 6.39 
2 425.26 250.56 147.39 38.08 9.05 10.02 8.67 5.86 
3 280.42 163.56 95.19 23.08 8.95 9.81 8.40 5.33 
4 208.01 120.06 69.09 15.58 8.85 9.60 8.13 4.79 
5 164.56 93.96 53.43 11.08 8.75 9.40 7.86 4.26 
6 135.59 76.56 42.99 8.08 8.65 9.19 7.59 3.73 
7 114.90 64.13 35.53 5.93 8.56 8.98 7.32 3.20 
8 99.38 54.81 29.94 4.33 8.46 8.77 7.04 2.66 
9 87.31 47.56 25.59 3.08 8.36 8.56 6.77 2.13 
10 77.66 41.76 22.11 2.08 8.26 8.35 6.50 1.60 
11 69.76 37.01 19.26 1.26 8.16 8.14 6.23 1.07 
12 63.17 33.06 16.89 0.58 8.06 7.93 5.96 0.53 
13 57.60 29.71 14.88 0.00 7.97 7.73 5.69 0.00 
14 52.83 26.85 13.16  7.87 7.52 5.42  
15 48.69 24.36 11.67  7.77 7.31 5.15  
16 45.07 22.19 10.36  7.67 7.10 4.88  
17 41.87 20.27 9.21  7.57 6.89 4.61  
18 39.03 18.56 8.19  7.47 6.68 4.33  
19 36.49 17.03 7.27  7.38 6.47 4.06  
20 34.21 15.66 6.45  7.28 6.26 3.79  
21 32.14 14.42 5.70  7.18 6.06 3.52  
22 30.26 13.29 5.02  7.08 5.85 3.25  
23 28.54 12.26 4.41  6.98 5.64 2.98  
24 26.96 11.31 3.84  6.88 5.43 2.71  
25 25.52 10.44 3.32  6.79 5.22 2.44  
26 24.18 9.64 2.83  6.69 5.01 2.17  
27 22.94 8.89 2.39  6.59 4.80 1.90  
28 21.79 8.20 1.97  6.49 4.59 1.63  
29 20.72 7.56 1.59  6.39 4.38 1.35  
30 19.72 6.96 1.23  6.29 4.18 1.08  
31 18.79 6.40 0.89  6.20 3.97 0.81  
32 17.91 5.87 0.58  6.10 3.76 0.54  
33 17.09 5.38 0.28  6.00 3.55 0.27  
34 16.31 4.91 0.00  5.90 3.34 0.00  
35 15.58 4.47   5.80 3.13   
36 14.89 4.06   5.70 2.92   
37 14.24 3.67   5.61 2.71   
38 13.62 3.30   5.51 2.51   
39 13.04 2.94   5.41 2.30   
40 12.48 2.61   5.31 2.09   
41 11.95 2.29   5.21 1.88   
42 11.45 1.99   5.11 1.67   
43 10.96 1.70   5.02 1.46   
44 10.51 1.42   4.92 1.25   
45 10.07 1.16   4.82 1.04   
46 9.65 0.91   4.72 0.84   
47 9.24 0.67   4.62 0.63   
48 8.86 0.44   4.52 0.42   
49 8.49 0.21   4.43 0.21   
50 8.14 0.00   4.33 0.00   
51 7.79    4.23    
… …    …    
… …    …    
94 0.00    0.00    
The “Effective Government Cost per Unit” function is dependent on the values of β 
that the consumers choose in the end. Besides, its definition differs depending on 
the reference with respect to which the calculation is expressed. We denote as gP   
the cost that the government pays per unit of the vaccines that were effectively 
used by the consumers; and by gP  the government cost per unit of available 
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vaccines. The respective definitions of these functions are given by the following 
equations: 
)pd(1Pg   and )pd(X
1PgX        (8)  
Figure 3: Government cost per unit (wrt available and purchased vaccines) 
 
The outcomes resulting for different values of β are reported in Table 6, and the 
same findings are also illustrated by means of two diagrams in Figure 3.  A simple 
inspection of the data confirms that the minimum possible payment made by the 
government corresponds to the case in which β =. X  It cannot be different 
because, at this level, the β chosen by the consumers is equal to the total amount 
that the government purchased through the advanced market commitment. 
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An interesting matter is, perhaps, to calculate the threshold at which the value of β 
permits the government subsidy to be smaller than the price actually paid by the 
consumers.  For this purpose, we propose a transformation of the first function in 
expression (8), which leads to: 
pX)pd(1Pg 
        (9) 
Notice that by definition β < X . By looking at the new form of function gP  , it is 
obvious that β = X  leads to the minimum value of the function: 0Pg  . But the 
question now is to find the value of β at which it starts to hold that pPg  . It is very 
easy to prove that it happens for any β > X /2.  This result, even if trivial, is 
highlighted in Table 6 by using bold and italic characters. 
Conclusion 
The main idea of this paper refers to competitive industries with external 
economies of scale. In this context, we have shown that, unless the policy involves 
implementation costs that are too heavy, adopting well-planned tax subsidy 
programmes can always have Pareto-improving effects. 
First, the paper has examined the impact – in terms of social welfare – of 
introducing tax-subsidy programs in markets characterized by the presence of 
external economies scale. Then, the analysis has focused on studying the vaccine 
industry as one appropriate example for illustrating the theoretical aspects. 
From the theoretical analysis, the presence of external economies of scale permits 
that tax-subsidy schemes may always be designed in such a way that they improve 
the welfare status of all the economic agents involved in the matter. Besides, the 
setting of the model has been designed for the redistributive policy to be self-
financing. Moreover, if the transfer is properly arranged, it can always lead to 
Pareto-improving situations. We venture that this theoretical possibility may help 
explaining the success of existing programs that provide vouchers to low-income 
individuals. This is because none of the incumbent consumers experience losses 
in welfare, whereas a number of new individuals gain access to the market by 
purchasing the good at a subsidized price. 
Our approach involves both the demand and the supply side of the market, since 
the external economies affect the shape of the aggregate supply, while the tax 
subsidy programme influences the effective demand function.  In this context, we 
have proved that intervention is capable of increasing the total amount of trade in 
the industry while the equilibrium price declines, thereby having Pareto-improving 
effects. Naturally, this is the case unless the cost of implementing the policy was 
too high. Our result reinforces the idea that intervention could be preferred in front 
of externalities, even under the assumption of perfect competition. 
To illustrate a real example, this paper has examined the case of the vaccine for 
the pandemic influenza H1N1. Even if the market of vaccinations was perfectly apt 
to examine the relevance of external economies of scales, due to the limited 
available information, we have adopted in Section 3 an approach that deviates 
from the original framework of Section 2. In the latter approach, two main features 
have been accounted for: (i) uncertainty about the amount of good that is 
demanded and (ii) the requirement that the government should take a decision (on 
the quantity to be purchased) ex ante, regardless of the actual private demand. 
After having described the behaviour and regulation of the modern industry of 
vaccines in reality, the paper shows that it is possible to implement better public 
practices to make the provision of vaccines more efficient and feasible for broader 
geographic areas. 
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In summary, the main idea of this paper is taking advantage of the external 
economies of scale to improve the welfare of all the agents of a particular market. 
Our study ultimately implies advocating intervention in competitive markets with 
external economies of scale, by means of adopting self-financing tax subsidy 
schemes. The originality of the analysis consists of stressing that these policies 
can always be implemented in one or another way. Further examination of the 
issue is, however, needed to evaluate the practical relevance of this idea and to 
examine to what extent certain specific industries are characterised by external 
economies of scale. 
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